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An Evolving Society:  The Juvenile’s  
Constitutional Right Against a Mandatory Sentence  
of Life (and Death) in Prison 
Robert Visca* 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court (“Court”) decided 
Miller v. Alabama,1 holding that it is unconstitutional to sentence juvenile 
homicide offenders to mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-parole.2  
With a clear holding in place, the only debatable aspect of Miller is the 
underlying spirit and intent of this decision.  The majority’s discussion and 
reasoning appears to support a broad interpretation of the holding.  This 
piece analyzes how courts and state actors are or should be applying Miller 
under this broad interpretation. 
The American juvenile justice system was founded on a principle that 
should still hold true today:  juvenile offenders can be rehabilitated.3  This 
belief is based on society’s recognition that juveniles are developmentally 
unique from adults.4  Behavioral and neuroscientific research on adolescent 
development indicates that juveniles lack crucial reasoning and risk-
assessment cognitive capabilities.5  In making decisions, juveniles “lack the 
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that 
could be detrimental to them.”6 
Furthermore, juveniles do not assess risk in the same way that adults 
do, because juveniles erroneously focus only on short-term consequences 
and fail to accurately consider the long-term consequences of their actions.7  
Other important differences include the fact that “adolescents are more 
 
 *  Florida International University College of Law, J.D. 2014; University of Florida B.S. 2010. I 
thank Professor Leonard P. Strickman and Professor Angelique Ortega Fridman for their guidance as I 
researched and wrote this Comment; and my parents, Silvio and Linda Visca for their support and 
encouragement. 
1 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
2 Id. at 2475. 
3 Danielle R. Oddo, Removing Confidentiality Protections and the “Get Tough” Rhetoric: What 
Has Gone Wrong With the Juvenile Justice System?, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 105, 105 (1998). 
4 Id. at 106. 
5 Emily C. Keller, Constitutional Sentences for Juveniles Convicted of Felony Murder in the 
Wake of Roper, Graham & J.D.B., 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 312-13 (2012). 
6 Id. at 312 (citation omitted). 
7 Id. at 313. 
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susceptible to peer pressure than are adults,”8 and the personality traits of a 
juvenile are more likely to change as the juvenile continues to develop and 
mature.9 
In the past, these apparent differences made juveniles less accountable 
in the eyes of the public, and illegitimate behavior at this early age was 
generally viewed as the result of correctable developmental deficiencies.10  
Thus, in rehabilitating juveniles, the criminal justice system preferred a 
clinical, rather than punitive, approach.11  The two general rationales for 
this approach were that “children are amenable and responsive to treatment, 
and this treatment was necessary to make up for the care which they were 
denied for most of their young lives.”12  Furthermore, allowing for “wide 
judicial discretion” was key for successful rehabilitation because 
individualized attention would provide juveniles the best opportunity to 
receive appropriately tailored treatment.13 
There may be no better evidence of how society views the mental 
capabilities of juvenile offenders than by the way various laws typically 
provide exceptions or different standards and treatment for individuals 
under the age of eighteen.  No individual under this age has full autonomy, 
as several laws create restrictions on the juvenile’s ability to make certain 
decisions.14 
Juveniles do not have the “authority to vote, serve on a jury, create a 
binding legal contract, purchase and possess a firearm, serve in the military, 
[ ] gamble,” or consume alcohol.15  Moreover, there are several activities 
that a juvenile cannot engage in without parental consent in most states, 
“including getting an abortion, getting married, purchasing pornography, 
getting a tattoo, or getting a body piercing.”16 
However, society’s confidence that a rehabilitation system would be 
most effective in handling juveniles began to waver over time.17  “[A]s 
juvenile crime rates [increased], and the stories of juveniles committing 
serious and violent crimes . . . received widespread and sensationalized 
coverage, the public . . . increasingly perceived that the nation [was] under 
 
8 Id. at 314. 
9 Id. at 314-15. 
10 Oddo, supra note 3, at 106-07. 
11 Id. at 107. 
12 Id. 
13 Catherine J. Ross, Disposition in a Discretionary Regime: Punishment and Rehabilitation in 
the Juvenile Justice System, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1037, 1038-39 (1995). 
14 Andrea Wood, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Confining Juveniles with Adults After Graham 
and Miller, 61 EMORY L.J. 1445, 1462-63 (2012). 
15 Id. at 1463. 
16 Id. 
17 Oddo, supra note 3, at 105-06. 
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siege.”18 
In the 1990s, this growing public fear led to state legislatures 
reworking their transfer procedures to allow for juveniles to be tried as 
adults for their crimes.19  “Between 1990 and 1999, the number of juveniles 
held in adult jails increased by more than 300%, while the overall adult jail 
inmate population only increased by 48%.”20  Naturally, juveniles would 
begin receiving longer and harsher sentences, such as life-without-the-
possibility-of-parole, which “places emphasis on retribution rather than 
rehabilitation.”21 
By 2012, over 2,500 individuals had been incarcerated to life-without-
the-possibility-of-parole for crimes they had committed as juveniles.22  
While this type of harsh sentence may be appropriate for certain crimes 
committed by both adults and juveniles, the psychological and 
developmental differences between these groups require that special care be 
taken before imposing it on juveniles. 
The Court has recognized the need to treat juveniles differently and 
has been curbing the excessive sentencing practices towards juveniles on a 
case-by-case basis for decades.  Miller is the Court’s most recent decision 
attempting to protect juveniles from unconstitutionally disproportionate 
punishments under the Eighth Amendment23 by eliminating mandatory life-
without-the-possibility-of-parole sentences for juvenile homicide 
offenders.24 
However, as affected cases (old and new) reach local dockets, and as 
states across the country attempt to move forward under Miller, a survey of 
the revamped juvenile-sentencing landscape reveals a troubling trend: the 
Court’s apparent intent in Miller to guarantee individualized sentencing for 
juvenile homicide offenders25 is being side-stepped. 
Part I of this note explores the Court’s pre-Miller Eighth Amendment 
cases that specifically deal with the constitutionality of sentencing practices.  
 
18 Id. at 105. 
19 Wood, supra note 14, at 1458-59. 
20 Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National 
Report, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 236 (2006), 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf. 
21 See Oddo, supra note 3, at 113. 
22 Against All Odds: Prison Conditions for Youth Offenders Serving Life without Parole 
Sentences in the United States, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 8 (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0112ForUpload_1.pdf. 
23 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. VIII. 
24 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
25 See id. 
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Part II examines the Court’s decision in Miller, looking at the rationale and 
argument for and against life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentences for 
juveniles.  Part III identifies how courts across the nation have properly 
been interpreting and applying Miller to juvenile cases.  Part IV analyzes 
the ways that state entities and courts can and have side-stepped the spirit of 
Miller and argues that courts should abide by the intent of Miller by 
providing every juvenile homicide offender with a meaningful hearing for 
courts to consider all mitigating factors before imposing a sentence of life-
without-the-possibility-of-parole. 
I. CASE PRECEDENT PRECEDING MILLER 
Over the past century, the Court has decided several cases that have 
shaped how courts impose sentences under the Eighth Amendment.  The 
Court has gained momentum in its sentencing jurisprudence over the past 
few decades, culminating in the Miller decision.  While any decision from 
the Court may be met with criticism or disagreement from one group or 
another, reviewing case precedent is an important tool when trying to 
understand how a present-day decision is reached.  A review of the cases 
preceding Miller clearly establishes the reasoning and trends that 
foreshadowed Miller. 
A. Principle of Proportionality 
There are countless cases that address Eighth Amendment issues, but 
Weems v. U.S.26 is arguably the first link in the long chain of cases leading 
up to Miller.  The Court in Weems was faced with the issue of whether a 
sentence of hard labor for falsifying government documents, which was 
imposed by a court in the Philippine Islands, constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.27 
In overturning the sentence, the Court discussed the fact that there is 
no clear definition of cruel and unusual punishment and implied that the 
punishment should fit the crime.28  The Court referenced the view that “it is 
a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and 
proportioned to [the] offense.”29  This principle would form part of the 
foundation for the Court’s current view on determining the constitutionality 
of sentencing. 
 
26  217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
27  Id. at 357-58. 
28  Id. at 368-70. 
29  Id. at 367. 
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B. Evolving Standards of Decency & Objective Indicia 
In Trop v. Dulles,30 the controversial punishment was the stripping of a 
military deserter’s citizenship,31 and the Court reiterated Weems by pointing 
out the ambiguity of the Eighth Amendment language.32  The Court 
determined that “[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”33  The evolving decency standard would become a central question 
in future Eighth Amendment cases.34 
In Gregg v. Georgia,35 the Court clarified how the “contemporary 
values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction” should be 
assessed.36  The Court must “look to objective indicia that reflect the public 
attitude toward a given sanction.”37  The Court further stated that, while 
important, public perceptions are not necessarily conclusive.38 
The Court elaborated on this objective indicia analysis in Coker v. 
Georgia.39  In Coker, the Court stated that Eighth Amendment 
determinations should not be “merely the subjective views of individual 
Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum 
possible extent.”40  This point was later reiterated in Rummel v. Estelle.41  
An example of an objective indicium utilized by the Court is a state’s actual 
sentencing practices in applying a law.42 
C. Mitigating Circumstances & Youth 
Another important development in this Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence is the need for courts to consider all of an offender’s 
mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest penalties possible.  
Initially, the Court suggested in Furman v. Georgia43 that leaving the 
 
30 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
31 Id. at 88. 
32 Id. at 99-100. 
33 Id. at 101. 
34 This standard has been reiterated in most Eighth Amendment cases following Trop. See Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); Hudson v. 
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 58 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012). 
35  428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
36  Id. at 173. 
37  Id. at 153. 
38  Id. 
39  433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
40  Id. at 592. 
41  445 U.S. 263, 275 (1980). 
42  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002). 
43  408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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imposition of a death penalty sentence up to the discretion of the judges was 
dangerous and should be prohibited.44  But the Court clarified this decision 
with its rulings in several similar cases that followed. 
In Roberts v. Louisiana,45 Woodson v. North Carolina,46 and Sumner v. 
Schuman,47 the Court held that it is unconstitutional to impose mandatory 
death penalties on offenders.48  The Court specifically stated in Woodson 
that it is important to “allow the particularized consideration of relevant 
aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the 
imposition upon him of a sentence of death.”49  Thus, following these 
decisions, a death penalty sentence is constitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment if the judge is permitted to first consider mitigating factors.50 
One broad mitigating factor that would become crucial in Miller is the 
offender’s youth.51  The importance of this factor has rapidly grown over 
the past few decades.  In Eddings v. Oklahoma,52 the Court recognized that 
youth is a “time and condition of life when a person may be most 
susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”53  Furthermore, the 
Court discussed how minors are typically less mature and responsible than 
adults,54 and stated that a minor’s age, background, and mental and 
emotional development must be considered in imposing a death sentence.55 
The Court added to this reasoning in Tison v. Arizona56 by tying the 
penological justification for retribution to the imposition of death on youth 
offenders.57  The Court stated that the “heart of the retribution rationale is 
that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability 
of the criminal offender.”58  In other words, the sentence must be 
proportional to the offender’s culpability, which is measured against the 
offender’s maturity level, emotional development, and background.59 
 
44 See generally id. 
45 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
46 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
47 483 U.S. 66 (1987). 
48 See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; Sumner, 483 U.S. at 85. 
49 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303. 
50 The Court later reaffirmed its position from Woodson in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-08 
(1978). 
51 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2458-59 (2012). 
52 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
53 Id. at 115. 
54 The Court recently reaffirmed this distinction in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 
2404 (2011), where it stated that “children cannot be viewed as miniature adults.” 
55 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116. 
56 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
57 Id. at 149. 
58 Id. 
59 See generally id. at 137. 
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Later in Johnson v. Texas,60 the Court succinctly summed up its 
reasoning for the importance of considering an offender’s youth before 
imposing a death sentence.61  The Court stated that the “relevance of youth 
as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the signature qualities of 
youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and 
recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.”62 
D. Categorical Bans on Sentencing Practices 
By the early 1980s, the Court had firmly established its reliance on the 
principles of proportional punishment, the objective determination of 
society’s standard of decency, and the consideration of mitigating factors, 
especially youth.  Moving forward, the Court would rely on these principles 
and rationales to begin implementing categorical bans on the imposition of 
the death penalty for particular groups. 
For example, in Enmund v. Florida,63 the Court held that the 
“imposition of the death penalty on one . . . who aids and abets a felon in 
the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not 
himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place” is 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.64  In Atkins v. Virginia,65 the 
Court prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on mentally 
handicapped criminals.66  And in Kennedy v. Louisiana,67 the Court found 
that rape offenders could not be sentenced to death where the victim died 
after the incident, if “the crime did not result, and was not intended to 
result, in the death of the victim.”68 
These decisions are important because they constructed the framework 
for courts to follow in analyzing the constitutionality of a sentence.  
However, the two most groundbreaking decisions for juvenile sentencing 
under the Eighth Amendment, which the Court most heavily relied on in 
Miller, are Roper v. Simmons69 and Graham v. Florida.70 
Both decisions created categorical bans on sentencing practices 
 
60  509 U.S. 350 (1993). 
61  Id. at 368. 
62  Id. 
63  458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
64  Id. at 797. 
65  536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
66  Id. at 321. 
67  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 554 U.S. 
945 (2008). 
68  Id. at 413. 
69  543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
70  560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
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directly pertaining to juveniles.71  While the ban in Roper prohibited the 
imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were minors when they 
committed their capital offenses,72 the ban in Graham reached new 
territory, as it prohibited a court from imposing a life-without-the-
possibility-of-parole sentence on a juvenile for a non-homicide offense.73 
In Roper, the offender committed first-degree murder when he was 
seventeen-years-old and was later convicted and sentenced to death.74  The 
Court synthesized the abundance of case law that has been described above 
into a two-part analysis: 1) “a review of objective indicia of consensus, as 
expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures;” and 2) a 
determination “in the exercise of [the Court’s] own independent judgment, 
whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.”75 
For the first factor, the Court determined that a majority of states had 
already enacted laws prohibiting the death penalty for juveniles, and in the 
states lacking this prohibition, actual sentences of death for juveniles was 
exceedingly rare.76  Thus, “the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the 
majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the 
books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice,” 
showed that there was no national consensus in favor of this punishment for 
juveniles.77 
As to the second factor, the Court stated that capital punishment 
should be reserved for the worst offenders and described three differences 
that set juveniles apart from this status of offender:78 1) juveniles are less 
mature and responsible; 2) “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to 
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure;” and 3) 
juveniles have personality traits that are “less fixed.”79  These differences 
can result in the lessened or diminished culpability of a juvenile.80 
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the juvenile’s diminished 
culpability makes a retributive punishment excessive, and there is no 
evidence that the death penalty served as an effective deterrent.81  While the 
Court acknowledged that there is always the rare possibility that a 
 
71  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. 
72  Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
73  Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. 
74  Roper, 543 U.S. at 556-58. 
75  Id. at 564. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. at 567. 
78  Id. at 569. 
79  Id. at 569-70. 
80  Id. at 571. 
81  Id. at 571-72. 
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competent, mature, and depraved juvenile, who committed a despicable 
crime, is deserving of the death penalty, it would be too difficult for courts 
to make accurate determinations, and too dangerous to risk them being 
wrong.82 
In Graham, the juvenile was sentenced to life-without-the-possibility-
of-parole83 for non-homicide offenses.84  Again, the Court used the same 
two-part analysis described earlier.85  The Court looked at actual sentencing 
practices across the States, and concluded that the imposition of life-
without-the-possibility-of-parole sentences on juveniles was rare.86 
Furthermore, the fact that some states have dual-statute systems, where 
the juvenile is eligible for transfer to adult court under one statute, and then 
sentenced according to the sentencing guidelines for adults found in another 
statute, does not sufficiently indicate that a state legislature intended for 
juveniles to receive such a harsh penalty.87 
The Court in Graham then reaffirmed the Roper rationale, describing 
how the differences between juveniles and adults create lessened culpability 
for juveniles.88  Furthermore, the Court likened life-without-the-possibility-
of-parole for juveniles to a death sentence by highlighting the shared 
characteristics of the two.89  The Court stated that both create a “forfeiture 
that is irrevocable,” and both “deprive[] the convict of the most basic 
liberties without giving hope of restoration.”90 
The Court also considered the penological justifications, or lack 
thereof, for retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation as they 
pertain to this harsh penalty for juveniles.91  The Court stated that a 
“sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature 
disproportionate to the offense,”92 and concluded that none of these 
punishment goals justify life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentences for 
juveniles who commit non-homicidal crimes.93 
The Court found that a juvenile’s lessened culpability makes 
 
82  Id. at 573. 
83  The juvenile was sentenced to life in prison, but because Florida had previously abolished its 
parole system, the juvenile had no possibility to be released, other than by executive clemency. 
84  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 56-57 (2010). 
85  Id. at 61-73. 
86  Id. at 62-67. 
87  Id. at 66-67. 
88  Id. at 67-70. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. at 69-70. 
91  Id. at 71. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
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retribution and deterrence ineffective here.94  Retribution is directly tied to 
the criminal’s culpability, and deterrence requires criminals to consider the 
consequences of their crimes prior to committing them, which juveniles are 
not likely to do anyway.95 
Incapacitation would be ineffective due to the extreme difficulty courts 
would face in trying to predict a juvenile’s future threat to society, as he 
matures and reaches adulthood.96 
As for the goal of rehabilitation, a life-without-the-possibility-of-
parole sentence completely precludes its purpose for obvious reasons.97  
While the Court made it clear that a state did not have to guarantee a 
juvenile’s release at some point, states are required to provide “all juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.”98 
II. EXAMINING MILLER 
With the precedent of Roper and Graham in place, which heavily 
relied on the youth argument,99 the Court was ready to extend these 
arguments to another previously untouched area of sentencing for juveniles, 
mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-parole for homicide offenders.  
While the type of sentence being addressed is different, the Court’s simple, 
but important, theme remains the same: “that imposition of a State’s most 
severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were 
not children.”100 
In Miller, the Court decided two companion cases, both of which dealt 
with juveniles who were convicted of murder and sentenced to mandatory 
life-without-the-possibility-of-parole.101  The key fact in both cases was that 
neither court was permitted to use discretion in deciding the proper 
sentences.102 
A. Facts of the Two Cases 
One of the cases involved petitioner, Kuntrell Jackson (“Jackson”), a 
 
94  Id. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. at 72. 
97  Id. at 73-75. 
98  Id. at 79. 
99  As discussed earlier, the Court has repeatedly argued that minors may have lessened 
culpability due to their maturity level, mental and emotional development, and transitory characteristics, 
which also negate the penological justifications for the sentences. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 70-74. 
100 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012). 
101 Id. at 2460. 
102 Id. 
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fourteen-year-old who robbed a store with two other juveniles.103  While 
Jackson waited outside, the other two juveniles entered the store to 
commence the robbery.104  Shortly after Jackson entered the store, one of 
the other juveniles shot and killed the store clerk.105  Arkansas law allowed 
the prosecutor to use discretion in determining whether to charge Jackson as 
an adult for this serious crime.106 
The prosecutor charged Jackson as an adult with capitol felony murder 
and aggravated robbery, and the trial court refused to transfer the case to 
juvenile court after considering the facts, a psychological examination, and 
Jackson’s arrest history.107  Pursuant to Arkansas law,108 the only 
permissible sentence for these crimes was life-without-the-possibility-of-
parole.109  Jackson later filed a state petition for habeas corpus, but the 
circuit court dismissed it, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the 
dismissal.110 
Petitioner Evan Miller (“Miller”) was also fourteen years old when he 
committed his crime.111  Miller attempted to steal money from the 
unconscious victim while drinking and doing drugs at the victim’s trailer.112  
However, the victim awoke during this act, and grabbed Miller’s throat.113  
After Miller’s friend hit the victim with a baseball bat, allowing Miller to 
go free, Miller repeatedly hit the victim with the bat.114 
Miller and his friend then lit the trailer on fire, killing the victim.115  
Alabama law116 also allowed the prosecutor to transfer the case to adult 
court.117  Miller was subsequently convicted of murder in the course of 
arson,118 which carried a minimum punishment of mandatory life-without-
the-possibility-of-parole.119  The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 
affirmed, and the Alabama Supreme Court denied review.120 
 
103 Id. at 2461. 
104  Id. 
105  Id. 
106  Id. 
107  Id. 
108  See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-4-104(b) (West 1997). 
109  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. at 2462. 
112  Id. 
113  Id. 
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  See ALA. CODE § 12-15-34 (1977). 
117  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
118  Id. at 2463. 
119  See ALA. CODE §§ 13-A-5-40(9), 13A-6-2(c) (1982). 
120  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012). 
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The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari in both cases 
and held that sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to mandatory life-
without-the-possibility-of-parole is unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment.121 
B. Court’s Reasoning 
The Court first pointed out that the purpose of the Eighth Amendment 
is to ensure that proportionate sentencing practices are used.122  Moreover, 
the Court considered the “evolving standards of decency” in society when 
determining what marks a proportionate sentence.123  The two lines of 
precedent addressing proportionate sentencing are those: 1) creating 
categorical bans on sentences “based on mismatches between the 
culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of the penalty;” and 2) 
requiring individualized sentencing schemes for the death penalty.124 
The Court noted that many of the cases creating categorical bans, such 
as Roper125 and Graham,126 were aimed at juveniles because of their 
lessened culpability.127  These cases established that “children are 
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.”128  The 
Court justified this gap between adults and juveniles129 by citing the three 
differences between the two groups mentioned in Roper.130  Furthermore, 
the Court cited the reasoning set out in Graham131 for why the “distinctive 
attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the 
harshest sentences on juvenile offenders.”132 
Moreover, the Court pointed out that the discussion in Graham about 
the mental and environmental characteristics affecting juveniles is not crime 
specific, and thus, applies to any life-without-the-possibility-of-parole 
sentence imposed on a juvenile.133  Mandatory sentencing practices prevent 
a sentencing court from considering a juvenile’s youth and attendant 
circumstances.134  Without this consideration, a court would be unable to 
 
121  Id. at 2475. 
122  Id. at 2463. 
123  Id. 
124  Id. at 2463-67. 
125  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
126  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
127  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463. 
128  Id. at 2464. 
129  Id. 
130  Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70. 
131  Graham, 560 U.S. at 70-74. 
132  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. at 2466. 
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ensure that a juvenile received a punishment that is proportional to the 
offense.135 
The Court then reiterated its view on the similarities between a death 
sentence and a life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentence for 
juveniles.136  These similarities make it that much more crucial137 that a 
court is able to consider any and all mitigating factors when imposing such 
a harsh sentence on a juvenile.138  Prior to applying its rationale to the facts, 
the Court nicely summed up its position: 
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of 
his chronological age and its hallmark features-among them, 
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences.  It prevents taking into account the family and home 
environment that surrounds him-and from which he cannot usually 
extricate himself-no matter how brutal or dysfunctional.  It neglects the 
circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his 
participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures 
may have affected him . . . . And finally, this mandatory punishment 
disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the 
circumstances most suggest it.139 
Jackson neither killed, nor intended to kill, the victim on the night of 
the robbery.140  He was sentenced to life-without-the-possibility-of-parole 
for merely aiding and abetting.141  His age, ability to assess the risk of his 
actions, and family background go to the culpability analysis.142  For 
example, Jackson’s mother and grandmother had shot individuals in the 
past.143 
As for Miller, not only was he on drugs and inebriated at the time of 
his crime, he also had a disturbing “pathological background.”144  He was 
physically abused by his stepfather, neglected by his alcoholic and drug-
addicted mother, in and out of foster care, and suicidal.145  Thus, the Court 
stated that although these circumstances certainly do not excuse Miller’s 
 
135  Id. 
136  Id. at 2466-67. 
137  The Court discussed the dangers of mandatory sentencing, such as sentencing fourteen and 
seventeen-year-olds alike, as well as the shooter and the accomplice.  Id. at 2467-68. 
138  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467. 
139  Id. at 2468. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. at 2468. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. at 2469. 
145  Id. 
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behavior in any way, they are relevant to consider before imposing a 
sentence of life-without-the-possibility-of-parole.146 
C. Opposing Arguments 
The Court addressed and rejected the respondents’ two opposing 
arguments that: 1) the holding here conflicts with Eighth Amendment 
precedent; and 2) “individualized circumstances [already] come into play in 
deciding whether to try a juvenile offender as an adult.”147 
First, the respondents contended that the Court’s previous case, 
Harmelin v. Michigan,148 precluded the holding here because the Court 
there upheld a mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentence for 
a drug charge, “reasoning that a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and 
unusual does not becom[e] so simply because it is mandatory.”149  
Moreover, the Court in Harmelin “refused to extend [the individualized 
sentencing for death penalty cases] command to noncapital cases ‘because 
of the qualitative difference between death and all other penalties.’”150 
In dismissing this argument, the Court in Miller explained that 
Harmelin was not intended to apply to sentencing for juveniles.151  The 
Court reasoned that sentencing rules frequently differ for adults and 
juveniles, and that these sentencing exceptions are by no means an “oddity 
in the law.”152  The Court aptly remarked that “if [] ‘death is different,’ 
children are different [too].”153  Thus, the Court found that Miller does not 
conflict with Harmelin.154 
Second, the respondents contended that “because many States impose 
mandatory life-without- parole sentences on juveniles,155 [the Court cannot] 
hold the practice unconstitutional.”156  The Court responded that the 
supposed evidence of national consensus actually does not distinguish this 
situation from other cases where the Court found that a sentencing practice 
 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 2470. 
148 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
149 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012) (quoting Harmelin) (internal citations 
omitted). 
150 Id. (quoting Harmelin). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. (quoting Harmelin). 
154 Id. at 2470. 
155 Id. at 2471 (respondents pointed to statistics indicating that twenty-nine jurisdictions impose a 
mandatory life- without-the-possibility-of-parole sentence for some juveniles convicted of murder in 
adult court). 
156 Id. at 2470. 
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violated the Eighth Amendment.157 
Furthermore, of the twenty-nine jurisdictions imposing a mandatory 
life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentence for juveniles convicted of 
murder, “more than half” do so through the combination of two 
independent statutes.158  “One allowed the transfer of certain juvenile 
offenders to adult court, while another . . . set out the penalties for any . . . 
individuals tried there.”159  The Court was not convinced that States actually 
intended for these two statutes to work in this way.160 
The Court also dismissed the notion that the ability of courts in some 
jurisdictions to use discretion in transferring juveniles to adult court makes 
the Court’s holding here unnecessary.161  First, the Court reasoned that the 
“decisionmaker typically will have only partial information . . . this 
early . . . about either the child or the circumstances of his offense.”162  And 
second, a sentencing judge in adult court has more sentencing options 
available to him than does the decisionmaker at a transfer hearing.163 
For example, in adult court, the sentencing body can impose a 
“lifetime prison term with the possibility of parole or a lengthy term of 
years.”164  Thus, the Court concluded that a judge’s discretion at the transfer 
stage does not substitute for the discretion utilized during post-trial 
sentencing in adult court.165 
Based on these arguments and policy considerations, the Court held 
that sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to mandatory life-without-the-
possibility-of-parole is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.166  
With the Miller decision in place, the burden now shifts to the lower courts 
across the nation to appropriately apply this holding to incarcerated 
juveniles who have been improperly sentenced, as well as to future cases. 
In his dissent,167 Justice Thomas addressed how he thinks this decision 
will ultimately affect the lower courts.168  He argued that the Court’s stating 
that discretionary life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentences would be 
 
157 Id. at 2471. 
158 Id. at 2472-73. 
159 Id. at 2472. 
160 Id. at 2472-73.  While this argument is not highly persuasive, the national consensus 
consideration was not a significant factor utilized by the Court in reaching its decision. 
161 Id. at 2474. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 2474-75. 
165 Id. at 2475. 
166 Id. 
167 The author will not discuss here a concurring opinion and two additional dissenting opinions 
from Miller. 
168 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2482. 
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“uncommon . . . may well cause trial judges to shy away from imposing life 
without parole sentences and embolden appellate judges to set them aside 
when they are imposed.”169  This statement by the Court, Justice Thomas 
believes, is the Court’s attempt to “shape the societal consensus of 
tomorrow.”170  However, based on the trends arising so far, it appears that 
some courts and state entities are doing their best to avoid Miller’s intent.171 
III. WAYS IN WHICH COURTS ARE ABIDING BY MILLER 
An evaluation of the various ways in which courts have responded in 
the wake of Miller shows that many courts are doing exactly what they 
should be doing: following the Court’s intent in Miller that juvenile 
homicide offenders receive individualized sentencing.172  Certain positive 
trends have emerged in the actions taken thus far by courts.173  These 
actions can only be judged by their compliance, or lack thereof, with the 
Court’s mandate as set forth in Miller last summer.  The following sections 
identify the proper course of actions that have been taken in the wake of 
Miller. 
A. Remanding Mandatory Life-Without-The-Possibility-Of-Parole Cases 
for Resentencing Hearings 
The clearest form of compliance with Miller comes in the form of 
appellate courts that remanded cases in which mandatory life-without-the-
possibility-of-parole sentences were imposed on defendants who were 
juveniles at the time they committed homicide offenses.  The Court in 
Miller concluded its extensive opinion with a straightforward holding: 
By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime 
incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and 
age-related characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the 
mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of 
proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment.174 
Many courts across the country have construed these words to mean exactly 
what they say.  From appellate courts in Texas, to Florida, to Pennsylvania, 
and California, decisions for remand and resentencing are pouring in, as 
courts far and wide do their part to ensure that juveniles affected by the 
 
169  Id. at 2486. 
170  Id. 
171  See infra Part IV. 
172  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
173  See infra Part III. 
174  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
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Miller holding receive their now constitutionally-protected right to 
individualized sentencing.175 
Even in a Florida appellate case where the conviction and sentence 
were reversed for other reasons, the appellate court still took the time to 
mention the holding in Miller and warned that the “trial court should be 
mindful of Miller.”176 
B. U.S. v. Maldonado: Considering Mitigating Factors from Miller177 
During Sentencing Stage of Initial Trial 
While nearly all of the cases to address Miller so far are from the 
appellate level, U.S. v. Maldonado178 is a post-Miller trial court level case 
that involved the conviction of a juvenile for homicide offenses and the 
imposition of a life sentence.179  In its opinion, the Maldonado court took 
the factors set forth in Miller into consideration prior to making a ruling.180 
The court in Maldonado weighed the defendant’s age, level of 
remorse, prior criminal history, “capacity or will to rehabilitate himself,” a 
psychological evaluation, and “all of the ‘hallmark features’ associated with 
a person of that young age,” against the nature and gravity of the crimes he 
was convicted of.181  Based on its analysis, the court in Maldonado still 
found a life sentence to be appropriate under the circumstances,182 which is 
fully in line with the Court’s intent in Miller.183 
C. Properly Handling a Statutory Presumption of Life-Without-the-
Possibility-of-Parole in California 
The appellate cases arising in California under Miller appear to be 
focused on California Penal Code Section 190.5(b),184 which, although not 
 
175  See People v. Silva, No. B225127, 2012 WL 6721537 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2012); People 
v. Moffett, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1465 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); People v. Banks, No. 08CA105, 2012 WL 
4459101 (Colo. App. Sept. 27, 2012); Rocker v. State, No. 2D10-5060, 2012 WL 5499975 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2012) (opinion withdrawn); Washington v. State, 103 So. 3d 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2012); State v. Simmons, 99 So. 3d 28 (La. 2012); State v. Graham, 99 So. 3d 28 (La. 2012); State v. 
Brooks, No. 47,394-KA, 2012 WL 6163089, (La. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2012); Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 
A.3d 732 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); Commonwealth v. Lofton, 57 A.3d 1270 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); Wilson 
v. State, No. 14-09-01040, 2012 WL 6484718 (Tex. App. Dec. 13, 2012); Henry v. State, No. 05-11-
00676 CR, 2012 WL 3631251 (Tex. App. Aug. 24, 2012). 
176  Miller v. State, 127 So. 3d 580, 587 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
177  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 
178  U.S. v. Maldonado, No. 09 Cr. 339-02, 2012 WL 5878673 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2013). 
179  Id. at *1. 
180  Id. at *9-10. 
181  Id. 
182  Id. at *10 (quoting Miller). 
183  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012). 
184  CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5(b) (1990). 
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mandatory, seemingly creates a presumption in favor of life-without-the-
possibility-of-parole sentences for juveniles who commit a particular 
murder crime.185  Section 190.5(b) states that “[t]he penalty for a defendant 
found guilty of murder . . . who was . . . under the age of 18 years at the 
time of the commission of the crime, shall be confinement in the state 
prison for life without the possibility of parole or, at the discretion of the 
court, 25 years to life.”186 
In three California appellate cases187 arising under Miller, which all 
deal with this Section, the courts were able to resist the temptation to take 
the easy way out by simply proclaiming that the sentencing scheme is 
discretionary, and thus, not falling under Miller.  The courts understood that 
Section 190.5(b) created the potential for a trial court to fail to provide a 
juvenile with individualized sentencing by merely imposing the proscribed 
life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentence.188 
In each case, the court assessed whether the trial court actually 
considered all potentially mitigating factors before imposing life 
sentences.189  Ultimately, all three sentences were approved because the 
sentencing courts took the mitigating factor of youth into consideration 
prior to imposing a sentence.190 
D. Remanding Discretionary Punishment Case For Resentencing Due to 
Failure to Consider Mitigating Factors 
Another example of how courts are abiding by the spirit of Miller is 
Daugherty v. State,191 where the seventeen-year-old defendant was 
sentenced to life-without-the-possibility-of-parole for committing a second-
degree murder, as well as two counts of attempted second-degree murder, 
under a discretionary sentencing scheme in Florida.192  Again, the court 
could have justified affirming the sentence by pointing to the fact that this 
sentence was not mandatory, and thus not encompassed by Miller.  
However, the court in Daugherty chose to abide by the spirit of Miller and 
 
185  Id. 
186  Id. 
187  See People v. Abella, No. Co66010, 2013 WL 28896 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2013); People v. 
Gutierrez, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 249 (Ct. App. 2012); Lewis v. Miller, No. 2:11-cv- 0423 LKK EFB P, 2012 
WL 4469236 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2012). 
188  See Abella, 2013 WL 28896, at *7-8; Gutierrez, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d  at 260-61; Lewis, 2012 
WL 4469236, at *22. 
189  See Abella, 2013 WL 28896, at *7; Gutierrez, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 61; Lewis, 2012 WL 
4469236, at *22. 
190  See Abella, 2013 WL 28896, at *8; Gutierrez, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 61; Lewis, 2012 WL 
4469236, at *22. 
191  Daugherty v. State, 96 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
192  Id. at 1077. 
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evaluated whether the trial court properly considered all mitigating factors 
before imposing this sentence.193 
The court in Daugherty stated that, although this is a discretionary 
sentence, Miller requires that “judges must take an individualized approach 
to sentencing juveniles in homicide cases and consider factors which 
predict whether a juvenile is amenable to reform or beyond salvation.”194  
Moreover, the court here recognized that the Court in Miller “stressed the 
sentencing judge’s responsibility” to consider the defendant’s youth and 
how it makes him different, culpability-wise, from an adult.195 
After evaluating the trial court’s analysis prior to sentencing, the court 
in Daugherty concluded that while the trial court considered the defendant’s 
remorse for committing the crimes, as well as his “upbringing,” the trial 
court failed to “expressly consider” whether any mitigating factors related 
to youth are present and would “diminish” the justifications for the life-
without-the-possibility-of-parole sentence.196  The court remanded the case 
for additional sentencing proceedings and made it clear that a life-without-
the-possibility-of-parole sentence may still be imposed, so long as a 
thorough evaluation of the defendant’s circumstances justified it.197 
E. Striking Down Term-of-Years Sentences that “Amounts to the 
Functional Equivalent of a Life Without Parole Sentence”198 
In Miller, the Court stated that “we require . . . [a sentencer] to take 
into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel 
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”199  While a 
sentencing scheme that imposes a mandatory life-without-the-possibility-
of-parole sentence is the most obvious form of life imprisonment, a term-
of-years sentence ranging from 70 years, to 80 years, and even over 100 
years in prison, creates these same issues.  This is especially true when no 
parole date is provided, or when the parole date will not come until the 
inmate is at least well into his nineties. 
While not a homicide case, People v. Caballero200 has rightly set the 
tone for how lengthy term-of-years sentences for juvenile homicide 
offenders should be treated under Miller.  In Caballero, the defendant, who 
was sixteen years old at the time of his crimes, was convicted of three 
 
193  Id. at 1079. 
194  Id. 
195  See id. 
196  Id. at 1080. 
197  Id. 
198  People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012). 
199  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
200  282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012). 
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counts of attempted murder and sentenced to consecutive sentences totaling 
110 years to life.201  While the analysis at the appellate level focused mostly 
on Graham, the court in Caballero did incorporate Miller into its 
discussion.202 
The court in Caballero noted that the defendant would not become 
parole eligible for over 100 years and stated that this sentence “amounts to 
the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence.”203  Pursuant to 
the holding in Graham, the court here concluded that this sentence violated 
the Eighth Amendment because the “parole eligibility date . . . falls outside 
the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy,” and the defendant would 
have “no opportunity to ‘demonstrate growth and maturity’ to try to secure 
his release.”204 
Utilizing Caballero, the courts in two other California appellate cases 
that did involve juvenile homicide offenders who received lengthy term-of-
years sentences reasoned and concluded that both sentences violated 
Miller.205 
In People v. Argeta, the fifteen-year-old defendant was convicted of 
murder and attempted murder and received an aggregate sentence of 100 
years in prison.206  Moreover, the defendant would not become eligible for 
parole for at least seventy-five years, which, as the court here stated, “likely 
requires that he be in prison for the rest of his life.”207  Relying on Miller 
and Caballero, the court in Argeta remanded the case for resentencing, 
citing Caballero’s reasoning that this type of sentence was the “functional 
equivalent of a life sentence without possibility of parole.”208 
In People v. Thomas, which involved another fifteen-year-old 
defendant, the trial court imposed an aggregate prison sentence of 196 years 
to life for a multitude of convictions, including first-degree murder.209  The 
court in Thomas quoted the trial judge’s statement during sentencing which, 
not surprisingly, seemingly involved an attempt to side-step the Court’s 
intent in Miller.210  The trial judge stated the following during sentencing: “I 
choose consecutive.  And it’s not going to be an LWOP [(i.e., a  term of life 
without the possibility of parole)] because I’m prohibited to do that because 
 
201  Id. at 293. 
202  Id. at 293-95. 
203  Id. at 295. 
204  Id. (citation omitted). 
205  See People v. Argeta, 210 Cal. App. 4th 1478, 1482 (2012); People v. Thomas, 211 Cal. App. 
4th 987, 1016 (2012). 
206  Argeta, 210 Cal. App. 4th at 1482. 
207  Id. 
208  Id. 
209  Thomas, 211 Cal. App. 4th at 1014-15. 
210  See id. at 1015. 
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of his age.”211  He then went on to say that “there’s no bright light at the end 
of the table for . . . [the defendant] . . . on this.  [S]o I intend to [run] 
consecutive everything I can.”212 
The court in Thomas then stated that the trial judge was incorrect in 
believing that a 196 year sentence was not equivalent to a sentence of life-
without-the-possibility-of-parole.213  Once again, the court in Thomas relied 
on Caballero’s rationale, along with Miller, and remanded the case for 
resentencing.214 
Whether the trial judge’s attempt to side-step Miller’s ban on 
mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentences for juvenile 
homicide offenders was intentional, or just simply a misunderstanding, it 
shows how easily sentencing courts can manipulate the system with term-
of-years sentences.  It will be up to appellate courts to continue to catch and 
correct these “mistakes” in the future. 
IV. WAYS THAT MILLER CAN BE SIDE-STEPPED 
While many courts are following the spirit of Miller to the fullest 
extent, others, including entire states, appear to be evading the true purpose 
of this landmark decision in an effort to maintain the status quo.  Whatever 
the reason for their actions, whether it be political, ideological, social, etc., 
it is important to recognize the mistakes early on because the constitutional 
rights of thousands of individuals may be detrimentally impacted. 
A. States Commuting Mandatory Life-Without-the-Possibility-of-Parole 
Sentences to Lesser Sentences for Juvenile Homicide Offenders 
Maybe the most alarming and dangerous way that Miller can be side-
stepped, due to how easy, public, and political it appears, is state entities, 
specifically governors and attorneys general, commuting juvenile homicide 
offenders’ mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentences to 
lesser sentences that still lack the element of individualization.  Although 
the United States is still in the early stages of sentencing jurisprudence 
following Miller, two states are already making a big splash nationally with 
their envisioned solutions in the wake of the Court’s decision.215 
 
211 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 1016. 
214 Id. 
215 See James Q. Lynch et. al, Branstad Commutes Life Sentences for 38 Iowa Juvenile 
Murderers, THE GAZETTE (July16, 2012), http://thegazette.com/2012/07/16/branstad-commutes-life-
sentences-for-38-iowa-juvenile-murderers; Todd Cooper, Pardons Board Can’t Speed Action on 
Juveniles’ Life Terms, KEARNEY HUB (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.kearneyhub.com/news/state/pardons-
board-can-t-speed-action-on-juveniles-life-terms/article_7b04feec-45f2-11e2-96c8-001a4bcf887a.html. 
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1. Iowa 
In Iowa, Governor Terry Branstad did not waste any time this past 
summer in stirring up a controversy over his solution following Miller to 
commute the crimes for the thirty-eight juvenile homicide offenders in 
Iowa, who all received mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-parole 
sentences upon being convicted.216  Governor Branstad “ordered each of the 
offenders to instead serve a mandatory 60 years before being considered for 
parole.”217  The Iowa governor explained his actions in a newspaper 
interview on July 16, 2012.218 
According to the governor, he made this decision after he “carefully 
reviewed” the Court’s ruling in Miller and “consulted with the Iowa 
Attorney General’s Office, victims’ families and county prosecutors.”219  
Governor Branstad further stated that he disagreed with the Court’s 
decision in Miller, calling the decision “cruel and unusual punishment” for 
putting victims and their families through “agony.”220  Moreover, the 
Governor elaborated on his concern for the emotional toll on the victims 
and their families in a separate news conference shortly after he made this 
controversial decision to commute the sentences.221 
In that press conference, Governor Branstad stated that it was 
important to remember the victims and not force them to “relive the pain of 
the tragedies.”222  Expressing his reasoning for his decision, he stated that 
the decision was made “to protect these victims, their loved ones’ 
memories, and to protect the safety of all Iowans.”223  The Iowa Attorney 
General supported the Governor, stating that, “[Iowa] needs to do all it can 
within the confines of the U.S. Supreme Court decision to help protect 
public safety.”224 
However, whether commuting these juveniles’ life-sentences to a 60 
year sentence follows the spirit of Miller is doubtful.  The Court in Miller 
explicitly stated in its holding that “our individualized sentencing decisions 
make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider 
mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalties 
for juveniles,” i.e. life in prison.225  Imposing a blanket, universal sentence 
 
216  Lynch, supra note 215. 
217  Id. 
218  Id. 
219  Id. 
220  Id. 
221  Id. 
222  Id. 
223  Id. 
224  Id. (emphasis added). 
225  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
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to all of these inmates defies any reasonable notion of what 
“individualized” means. 
Moreover, while a 60 year sentence is not technically a mandatory life-
without-the-possibility-of-parole sentence, it may become the “functional 
equivalent” of one, as stated in Caballero, depending on the 
circumstances.226  If some of these juveniles were eighteen years old or 
older at the time of their convictions, they would still essentially be facing a 
lifetime in prison before ever becoming eligible for release.  Thus, without 
any of them receiving the individualized sentencing intended by the Court 
in Miller, their constitutional rights are still being violated. 
2. Nebraska 
The Nebraska Board of Pardons (“Board”) has also expressed its 
desire to commute the sentences of their juvenile homicide offenders who 
received mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-parole.227  The Board 
consists of Nebraska Governor Dave Heieman, Attorney General Jon 
Bruning, and Secretary of State John Gale.228  Unlike in Iowa, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court delayed the plan after challenges were made from local 
defense attorneys.229  The Board’s plan to commute the sentences of 
twenty-four Nebraska prisoners affected by Miller to sentences of 50, 70, 
90, or even up to 100 years in prison arose in November, 2012.230  
Furthermore, the Board’s plan was based on similar rationale expressed by 
the Iowa Governor.231  The Attorney General’s spokeswoman stated that the 
Nebraska Supreme Court’s ruling to halt the Board’s plan was “contrary to 
Attorney General Bruning’s goal of protecting the public from violent 
criminals.”232 
As discussed earlier, automatically applying these sentences across the 
board fails to allow for each of the twenty-four prisoners to receive 
individualized sentencing hearings.233  Commuting sentences does not allow 
for a sentencer to consider the “mitigating qualities of youth” that the Court 
in Miller found essential to consider prior to imposing what amounts to life 
sentences for juveniles.234  Make no mistake, any sentence approaching 100 
years, regardless of how young the defendant is, will ensure that the 
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convicted exhale their final breaths in a prison cell. 
B. Imposing Sentences at Trial that are the Functional Equivalent of Life in 
Prison Without Considering Mitigating Factors 
As discussed earlier, imposing a lengthy term-of-years sentence can be 
the functional equivalent of life-without-the-possibility-of-parole because 
juveniles will spend the great majority of their lifetimes in a prison cell.  
While some courts, such as the one in Caballero, are effectively dealing 
with these types of sentences in light of the Court’s ruling in Miller, there is 
always the strong possibility that courts may justify this sentence as not 
falling within the purview of Miller. 
After all, the Court in Miller did state that, instead of sentencing a 
juvenile to mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-parole, one alternative 
is “a lengthy term of years” sentence.235  However, the Court also 
emphasized that less-harsh, alternative sentences could be imposed through 
the use of “discretionary sentencing.”236  Discretionary sentencing, 
according to the Court, means “a judge or jury must have the opportunity to 
consider mitigating circumstances.”237 
Furthermore, the Court in Miller reiterated what it stated in Graham 
about the similarities between life-without-the-possibility-of-parole 
sentences and the death penalty when it comes to juveniles.238  Referring to 
juveniles, the Court stated that “[i]mprisoning an offender until he dies 
alters the remainder of his life ‘by a forfeiture that is irrevocable,’” and this 
is “especially harsh” because a juvenile “will almost inevitably serve ‘more 
years in prison and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult 
offender.’”239  And just as the court in Caballero reasoned, a lengthy terms-
of-years sentence may prohibit a juvenile from seeking release until after 
his “natural life expectancy” has passed, and thus, is the “functional 
equivalent of life without parole.”240 
Thus, a court simply imposing a lengthy term-of-years sentence on a 
juvenile for a homicide conviction without conducting individualized 
sentencing, which would see the juvenile locked up for a majority of his or 
her entire life, arguably contradicts the Court’s intent in Miller. 
One case that may act as a precursor for these kinds of sentences, as 
well as a guide post for courts who disagree with Miller’s intent, is Bunch v. 
 
235  See id. at 2474-75. 
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Smith,241 a Sixth Circuit case. In Bunch, a sixteen-year-old was convicted of 
multiple non-homicide offenses.242  The state trial court sentenced the 
juvenile to consecutive, fixed terms, totaling 89 years in prison.243  The trial 
court imposed the maximum term of imprisonment for several of the 
counts, while never appearing to consider any mitigating factors.244 
The juvenile argued that his sentence was the “functional equivalent of 
life without parole” and “tantamount to a life sentence” under Graham.245  
However the court in Bunch denied his appeal and distinguished his case 
from the type covered by Graham.246  The court stated that the main 
difference between the instant case and Graham is that the defendant in 
Graham was sentenced to life in prison while the juvenile here received 
consecutive, fixed term sentences.247 
Moreover, the court in Bunch reasoned that Graham did not “address” 
juvenile offenders who receive lengthy sentences.248  The court even 
acknowledged that the 89-year sentence “may end up being the functional 
equivalent of life without parole,” but because the juvenile did not receive a 
life sentence as in Graham, he is not entitled to an opportunity for 
meaningful release.249 
Courts in the future may apply this same reasoning when it comes to 
juveniles raising appeals under Miller for 70, 80, or 90-year sentences.  
Courts may reason that Miller only covers mandatory life-without-the-
possibility-of-parole sentences, and thus there is no constitutional barrier to 
prevent a court from imposing an 80-year sentence on a seventeen-year-old.  
While this interpretation may comply with Miller on its face, locking a 
juvenile up for the remainder of his life, without providing for the 
opportunity to consider mitigating factors, appears to be what the Court in 
Miller sought to avoid. 
In Bunch, there was no question as to how the trial judge intended to 
sentence the juvenile offender, stating to the juvenile during sentencing 
that, “I just have to make sure that you don’t get out of the penitentiary. I’ve 
got to do everything I can to keep you there.”250  When judges believe that a 
juvenile defendant deserves to be in prison forever, some may turn to 
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questionable methods such as these to ensure that a convicted juvenile 
cannot, and will not, cause any more harm to society.251  But the Court’s 
intent in Miller was to prevent a juvenile from receiving “a sentence of life 
(and death) in prison” prior to first receiving an individualized sentencing 
hearing.252 
C. Hiding Behind Discretionary Sentencing Schemes Without Actually 
Considering Mitigating Factors 
Another route that courts may take that is similar in theory to imposing 
lengthy term-of-years sentences is refusing to remand cases for 
resentencing based on the fact that the imposed sentence was technically 
discretionary, and thus, does not fall within the scope of the Court’s 
decision in Miller of banning mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-
parole sentences.  Similar to a term-of-years sentence, a judge can choose to 
impose a life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentence instead of being 
mandated to do so by the language of a state’s criminal code. 
This type of situation is obviously facially different from the 
defendants’ situations in Miller, who were both convicted in states with 
mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-parole statutes.253  And courts 
could simply use similar logic that the court in Bunch employed and justify 
their appeal denials by stating that the holding in Miller is limited to only 
mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentences.254 
An example of a court utilizing this type of justification in denying a 
juvenile’s appeal for resentencing under Miller is State v. James.255  In 
James, the seventeen-year-old defendant was convicted of several homicide 
and non-homicide counts and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 315 
years in prison, with a requirement that nearly 268 of those years be served 
prior to becoming eligible for parole.256  The trial court imposed several 
consecutive and concurrent punishments subject to the No Early Release 
Act,257 without appearing to hold a hearing to consider any potential 
mitigating factors.258 
The juvenile then appealed his sentence under Miller, arguing that 
 
251  While Bunch provides an overt example of how a court can make an erroneous ruling under 
Miller, it shows how easily the spirit of Miller can be sidestepped. 
252  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012). 
253  Id. at 2461-63. 
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“though not mandatory, [his sentence] equates to a life sentence without 
parole, and therefore, runs afoul of Miller.”259  The state appellate court in 
James went on to deny this appeal by providing a very brief and undetailed 
explanation for its decision.260  The court pointed out that the defendants in 
Miller can be distinguished from the defendant here because those 
defendants were punished under mandatory sentencing schemes, absent any 
ability for a trial judge to use discretion.261 
Furthermore, the court here mentioned that the Court’s decision in 
Miller was based on two strands of precedent: 1) categorical bans on 
disproportionate punishments, and; 2) prohibiting the mandatory imposition 
of capital punishments.262  The court in James reasoned that the fact that the 
trial judge here had the discretion to impose different types of sentences 
rendered the Miller holding and its reliance on these two strands of 
precedent “inapposite.”263 
While the Court’s holding in Miller, narrowly read, does only refer to 
mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentences as being 
unconstitutional,264 courts like the one in James conveniently fail to 
mention what the Court had to say in the immediately succeeding paragraph 
to its holding (as well as ignoring the rest of the opinion).  The Court in 
Miller stated that while its holding is sufficient to decide the two cases, they 
did not think it necessary to consider the defendants’ argument for imposing 
a categorical ban on life-without-the-possibility-of-parole on juveniles.265  
As Miller was a 5-4 opinion, it is easy to see why the majority would leave 
this question for another day in its effort to secure the five votes. 
Moreover, the Court then stated the following: “[b]ut given all we 
have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children’s diminished 
culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate 
occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be 
uncommon.”266  Thus, while the Court in Miller is not “foreclos[ing]” a 
sentencing court’s ability to sentence a juvenile to life-without-the-
possibility-of-parole, it clearly is not advocating for this type of sentence to 
automatically or even typically be used in the alternative.267 
Additionally, this may be the Court’s way of implicitly placing the 
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legal world on notice that a categorical ban on life-without-the-possibility-
of-parole sentences for juveniles may be coming in the future.  A close look 
at the trend of the Court’s Eighth Amendment cases addressing sentencing 
schemes for juveniles seems to suggest that this type of ban may be likely 
in the future. 
Chief Justice Roberts even acknowledged this point in his dissenting 
opinion.268  The Chief Justice stated that “[t]oday’s holding may be limited 
to mandatory sentences, but the Court has already announced that 
discretionary life without parole for juveniles should be . . . ‘unusual.’”269  
He further stated that the “Court’s gratuitous prediction appears to be . . . an 
invitation to overturn life without parole sentences imposed by juries and 
trial judges,” and that the Court may be on its way to holding that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits these sentences for juveniles.270 
What does all of this mean?  It means that the Court in Miller is 
troubled by the current landscape of juvenile sentencing, especially when it 
comes to juveniles serving their entire lives in a prison cell.  Moreover, it 
appears that the words discretionary sentencing hold much more meaning 
and weight in the Court’s minds than in the minds of a few lower courts. 
D. Looking for Alternative Sentencing Schemes 
One judicial methodology that may be employed by future courts 
applying Miller is to identify and use alternative sentencing options that are 
available.271  Instead of providing for individualized sentencing as 
mandated in Miller,272 courts may look to their state statutes for the 
harshest, constitutionally permissible punishment available,273 or revive a 
previous version of the sentencing statute that would not technically violate 
the Court’s holding in Miller.274 
In People v. Banks, the defendant, fifteen years old at the time, was 
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life-without-the-
possibility-of-parole in Colorado.275  The appellate court correctly found 
that Miller bars this punishment and remanded the case for resentencing.276  
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If the court in Banks had stopped at that point, there would be no issues to 
speak of; however, the court goes on to provide instructions to the lower 
court regarding what sentence should be imposed during resentencing.277 
Instead of simply remanding for a resentencing hearing so that the 
lower court may consider mitigating factors, the court in Banks decided to 
apply Colorado’s codified severability clause.278  This resulted in the court’s 
instructing that the defendant be sentenced to life-imprisonment-with-the-
possibility-of-parole after forty years.279  Although the Court in Miller was 
focused on eliminating mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-parole 
sentences,280 the majority of the opinion is devoted to detailing the legal 
differences between adults and juveniles, and how these differences need to 
be considered before imposing a sentence with the potential for a lifetime 
spent in prison.281 
Moreover, the Court in Miller even explicitly stated that “Roper and 
Graham emphasized that the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the 
penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile 
offenders.”282  But in Banks, the court was doing its best “to impose the 
most serious penalty that is constitutionally permissible for such 
offenders.”283 
A fair reading of Miller would suggest that the point is not to merely 
impose the harshest penalty possible, but rather to make a justified 
sentencing determination based on all of the relevant information available 
to the court, including factors associated with the defendant’s youth. 
The concurrence in Partlow v. State brings to light a slightly different 
proposition than Banks, but is similarly based on an apparent effort to side-
step Miller.284  In Partlow, the court correctly reversed the juvenile 
defendant’s mandatory life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentence for 
resentencing.285  While Judge Makar agreed with the remand for 
resentencing under Miller, he wrote separately to propose that Florida 
courts should revive the state’s previous sentencing scheme, which would 
have imposed sentences of life-with-the-possibility-of-parole after twenty-
five years.286 
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With the current sentencing scheme for juvenile homicide offenders in 
Florida being ruled unconstitutional by the Miller Court, Judge Makar 
believed that reverting back to the old sentencing scheme, which does not 
involve a mandatory life sentence, would comply with the holding in 
Miller.287  He stated that reverting to this previous sentencing scheme would 
not contrast with the “individual-centric approach to sentencing juveniles” 
in Miller because a sentence that allows for parole is “quantitatively and 
qualitatively a far different sentence from mandatory life without parole.”288 
While not unreasonable, Judge Makar’s argument is still somewhat 
contradictory.  Judge Makar managed to openly acknowledge that the 
Court’s intent in Miller was for an “individual-centric approach,”289 while at 
the same time arguing for an across-the-board imposition of this alternative 
sentence.290  The problem with across-the-board sentencing is that it fails to 
provide each juvenile previously sentenced to a mandatory life-without-the-
possibility-of-parole sentence with the ability to receive an individualized 
resentencing hearing, which would allow the court to consider any and all 
mitigating factors. 
Granted, if a court imposes a 75 year sentence with the possibility of 
parole after 25 years, then the argument that the juvenile would not have 
any meaningful opportunity for release is obviously weakened.  But what if 
the possibility of parole is after 40 years of incarceration, as in Banks?291  
Or 60 years?  This becomes a much closer question worth analyzing before 
states decide to take any sweeping legislative steps. 
Judge Makar later points out that it may be “too costly [for the State] 
to conduct potentially burdensome youth-mitigating hearings in these cases; 
mitigation litigation is expensive.”292  Additionally, some may argue that it 
would be difficult for any court to recreate or replicate the circumstances 
surrounding cases that may have originally occurred ten, twenty, or even 
thirty years ago.  Not to mention the emotional turmoil that the victims’ 
families and loved ones would have to endure once again, as the Governor 
from Iowa pointed out.293 
While these are important concerns and should be addressed if 
possible, any proposed solution to these concerns cannot trample the 
constitutionally guaranteed right of another.  The Court in Miller made no 
mention of these concerns, focusing instead on correcting what it believed 
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to be the most troublesome issue presented to it by the parties that day: a 
violation of thousands of juveniles’ constitutional right against cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the Court’s recent record that the way juveniles are to 
be perceived and treated under the law is evolving and crystallizing with 
every new decision.  The Eighth Amendment, as it applies to the youth of 
America, has taken on a distinct meaning and a unique set of principles for 
all courts across the nation to adopt and abide by, whether agreeable or not.  
Society recognizes the cognitive, emotional, and developmental differences 
between adults and juveniles, and these differences are reflected all around 
us. 
From the disparities in legal rights and obligations owned and owed by 
adults and juveniles, to the endless volumes of academic studies and 
research indicating why and how juveniles are different, it would be 
difficult, to say the least, for anyone to enthusiastically argue against the 
widely accepted idea that individuals under the age of eighteen are 
generally less emotionally mature, cognitively developed, and 
“unsalvageable” when compared to adults. 
This is not to say that juveniles cannot commit unspeakable and 
unthinkable crimes, deserving of the harshest penalties available under the 
criminal justice system.  However, as the Court realized in Miller, the only 
true, fair, and constitutional way to determine if a juvenile’s devastating 
crime is deserving of a de facto death sentence, such as life-without-the-
possibility-of-parole, is for a sentencing court to take into consideration any 
and all mitigating factors of youth that may exist prior to imposing this 
sentence on a juvenile homicide offender. 
Maybe this evaluation will turn up nothing worthy of lessening the 
juvenile’s punishment, and maybe a life-without-the-possibility-of-parole 
sentence is exactly what a convicted juvenile has earned with his crimes.  
The Court is fine with that conclusion in the most deserving of occasions.  
But if this conclusion is formed, and this punishment imposed, in the 
absence of a full consideration of mitigating factors, then sentencing courts 
are not abiding by the Court’s intent. 
The juvenile justice system was founded on an ideal that somehow was 
forgotten and lost over time: juveniles can be rehabilitated.  The Court 
seems to be making an effort to revive this ideal by limiting the sentencing 
abilities of lower courts when it comes to juveniles.  Despite this effort, 
courts and state entities are having little difficulty finding ways to side-step 
the intent of Miller, and there may be no way to stop them without further 
action from the Court. 
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The Court should explicitly address whether actions such as 
commuting sentences, imposing lengthy term-of-years sentences without a 
meaningful opportunity for release, and reverting to older sentencing 
schemes, all of which lack any individualized sentencing mechanism, are 
sufficient to satisfy the spirit of Miller.  If these actions are not what the 
Court had in mind, as I believe is the case, then the Court should lay out 
exactly what type of procedure or individual hearing should be 
implemented, and in what circumstances, to ensure that juveniles’ 
constitutional rights are not violated. 
